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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20000139-CA

v.
BOBBY HODGES,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals his sentence following his conviction for attempted aggravated
assault by a prisoner, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 to -102.5
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that if
defendant paid $10,000 in restitution within six months, the
remainder of his $20,678.17 restitution obligation would be
stayed?

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that
defendant's sentence for attempted assault by a prisoner run
consecutively with the sentence defendant was then serving,
where the applicable statute presumes that consecutive
sentencing is appropriate?

A trial court's sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v.
Houk. 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). An abuse of discretion "may be manifest if
the actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposes a
'clearly excessive sentence.'" Id. (quoting State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah
App. 1995)(citations omitted)). However, "this [C]ourt may find an abuse of discretion
only if [it] conclude[s] that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the
trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v.
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are set forth in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Defendant, while a prisoner at the Beaver County Correctional Facility, struck
another inmate, Brian Dow, in the face after Dow changed the television channel (R.
44:7-8).
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault by a prisoner, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5 (R. 1). Defendant
pled guilty to one count of attempted assault by a prisoner, a class A misdemeanor under

because the procedural history and relevant facts of this case are closely
intertwined, they are stated in a single section of the State's Brief.
2

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102 to -102.5 (R. 16). At the plea hearing, the prosecutor stated
that the parties agreed that "defendant [would] pay restitution in the amount. ..
determined by the court. And there are some serious medical restitution amounts that we
are going to be talking about" (R. 43:7). When the trial court asked defendant if he
understood that he "could be required to pay restitution in an amount sufficient to cover
any loss, damage or injury that [he] may have caused," defendant replied that he
understood (R. 43: 9). After entering his guilty plea, defendant said, "I have no problem
on paying the restitution once I get off. I'm able to pay it, but not until then, because I
have no accesses [sic] of getting to my moneyfromhere" (R. 43:13-14).
A pre-sentence investigation report was filed (R. 29), but is not included in the
record on appeal.
On January 19, 2000, the trial court sentenced defendant (R. 44, Addendum B). At
the hearing, defense counsel argued that defendant should not be held responsible for the
full $20,658.17 in damages because he struck Dow in self defense (R. 44: 8-9). Defense
counsel argued that, contrary to Dow's statement in the presentence investigation report
that Dow "'changed the TV channel and defendant, Bobby Hodges, struck him in the
face,'" two witnesses observed defendant acting in self defense (R. 44:7-9). Defense
counsel urged the court to consider the handwritten account of Mark Granado, an inmate
at the correctional facility, who wrote that defendant struck Dow in self defense (R. 44:8).
Defense counsel also offered to have Mark Montez, another inmate, testify at the

3

sentencing hearing to corroborate Granado's written statement (R. 44:9). However,
neither of the witnesses had come forward earlier in the proceedings or testified at the
preliminary hearing (R. 44:11-12). In fact, according to the prosecutor, "no one, at [the]
time when the officer investigated . . . could really remember what had happened or had
seen anything. No one knew anything about it" (R. 44:11).
Defense counsel also maintained that a heavy restitution order would encumber
defendant's ability to "get on with his life and make some positive changes and contribute
to society" (R. 44: 10). Counsel told the court defendant wanted to go to college and
"pursue a degree in business administration" after his release from prison (id). Counsel
also stated that defendant had demonstrated a "a desire to sincerely change" and that
defendant had "gained new meaning in his life because of religion" (id.).
Defense counsel then stated:
Now, whatever amount the court determines will be fine. We simply
ask that it be a fair share of the restitution. Our suggestion, however, is this:
Mr. Hodges informs me that by collecting funds from family members
and from friends he's been able to come up with $10,000 which he
would be able to have paid as restitution in the very near future. And
so his suggestion would simply be that the court order restitution in the
amount of $10,000 to cover Mr. Hodges[c] participation in the altercation
and to cover his responsibility for what happened that day.
(R. 44: 9-10, Addendum B, emphasis added). The following discussion then occurred:
Prosecutor:

I assume that if family orfriendshave raised $ 10,000
that would be available in the near future, that that's
more than anyone would probably expect. And I
assume if he were to be placed on parole, he would, I
hope, would feel an obligation to pay that amount back
4

to whoever offered it for him. So I'm not adverse to
some kind of structure, whereas, if that money were to
go to the state right away, that the court would
consider a reduction in the amount of the restitution.
The Court:

Any response, Mr. Christiansen, on that subject?

Defense counsel:

We are pleased, if the state's willing, to make that
recommendation. And we agree that a lesser amount
than the full amount of restitution (inaudible).

The Court:

What is that structure you are proposing? When would
the $10,000 be paid?

Defense counsel:

Mr. Hodges informs me that the full $10,000 could
be paid within six months.

(R. 44: 13, Addendum B, emphasis added).
Defendant addressed the trial court. He told the court that while he committed the
offense in self defense, "I take my responsibility for it because I'm a man" (R. 44:13-14).
On the subject of why the other witnesses failed to testify earlier in the proceedings,
defendant and the trial court had the following discussion:
Defendant:

[P]rison people don't just come forward and tell on . . . the
inmate because you be labeled a snitch and you have major
problems. That's why no one came forward, because not
everyone was interviewed.... It's like over 20 some people
in the cell block.

The Court:

Um-hmm.... Do you have any idea of why these same
inmates now have chosen to come forward?

Defendant:

Basically, because they know I wasn't wrong.

The Court:

Sure would have been a lot more simple if they would have
said that in the first place, hu[h]?

Defendant:

Yeah, I know. But still, like I said before, not everyone was
interviewed.... It's kind of hard for a person just to come up
and tell on the person when you are doing time.

The Court:

Well, if you'll pardon a little digression, Mr. Hodges, that's
one of the problems with those that you are doing time with,
is that they don't understand the rules that makes society
operate. If they had come forward in the first place, you
might not even be standing there convicted. But because they
honored this code of silence, you are now suffering the
consequences.

Defendant:

I know all of that.

The Court:

Okay. I hope they do.

(R. 44:14-15, Addendum B).
The court sentenced defendant to one year in the Beaver County Jail, with the
sentence to run consecutive to the term he was already serving (R. 32; 44:15).2 The court
then stated:
On the subject of restitution, I'm going to fix the amount of
restitution at $20,658.17. But I'm also going to find that the defendant does
not have the current ability to pay that, at least, not while he's in custody.
So I'm going to order that if he pays $10,000 restitution within the next six
months, that he will not need to pay the remainder of the restitution.... [I]f
he does not pay the $10,000 within six months, then the order of the court
will be that he's to pay the entire amount of restitution upon his release.
(R. 44:15-16, Addendum B).

2

The record does not indicate the offense for which defendant was jailed at the
time he committed the offense in this case. However, after receiving his consecutive
sentence, defendant stated/Tm going to do at least three to five before I even do that
year" (R. 44: 17).
6

Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 39-40).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in ordering that if defendant paid
$10,000 of his $20,658.17 restitution obligation within six months of sentencing, the
remaining amount owed would be stayed. However, the record shows that defendant
requested that he not be required to pay the full amount of damages and expressly offered
to pay $ 10,000 within six months. Since defendant received exactly the restitution he
requested and represented he could pay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so
structuring the restitution order.
Defendant further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that
his one-year sentence for assaulting another inmate run concurrently with the sentence he
was then serving. However, the governing statute required the trial court to impose
consecutive sentence unless the court found that consecutive sentencing was
inappropriate. Nothing in the record indicates that consecutive sentencing was
inappropriate. Thus, the trial court correctly imposed a consecutive term.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING RESTITUTION BECAUSE THE ORDER WAS
BASED ON DEFENDANT'S REPRESENTATION THAT HE
COULD PAY $10,000 WITHIN SIX MONTHS
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$10,000 restitution within six months of the date of sentencing or, in the event that he did
not pay the $10,000 within six months, $20,658.17 following his release from prison.
Appellant's Brief at 5. Defendant maintains that the restitution order was "inherently
unfair," the trial court's decision was made "rashly," and that "no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Appellant's Brief at 5,8. Defendant
contends that the trial court recognized that defendant could not pay $10,000 within six
months. Appellant's Brief at 7. However, because defendant represented that he could
pay the $10,000 within six months, the court's decision was more than fair.
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
defendant make restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (1996) (emphasis
added). The trial court's obligation to order restitution is nondiscretionary. State v.
Stirba. 972 P.2d 918, 921-22 (Utah App. 1998).
A restitution order will not be disturbed on appeal unless it exceeds the amount
prescribed by law or constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d
8

649, 653 (Utah App. 1997). An abuse of discretion may happen when the court orders
restitution without considering the defendant's financial resources or ability to pay. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(c); see also Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 653 (holding that trial
court abused its discretion by ordering defendant to pay restitution "without discussion or
findings" regarding defendant's ability to pay). An abuse of discretion may also occur
when the court treats a defendant "rashly," with "hostility," or "worse than other
defendants." State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995).
Here, the record contains ample evidence that the trial court, before making the
restitution order, considered defendant's financial resources and ability to pay. In
accordance with Schweitzer, the court discussed and made findings regarding defendant's
financial resources and ability to pay (R. 44: 15-16). See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 653. At
the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that "Mr. Hodges informs me that by
collecting funds from family members andfromfriendshe's been able to come up with
$ 10,000 which he would be able to have paid as restitution in the very near future" and
"Mr. Hodges informs me that the full $10,000 could be paid within six months" (R. 44: 910, 13). The trial court tailored its order in accordance with defense counsel's
representations. The order simply reflects that the trial court took defendant at his word
and gave him exactly what he requested.
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant misconstrues his own
representations to the trial court, as well as the trial court's statements. First, defendant
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maintains that defense counsel's statements at sentencing regarding defendant's ability to
pay the $10,000 "indicated that at best the money could only be collected 'within six
months' of his release date." Appellant's Brief at 8. There is nothing in the record to
support defendant's assertion. In truth, defense counsel plainly stated that defendant
could pay "$10,000 . . . as restitution in the very near future.... within six months" (R.
44: 9-10,13). As defendant acknowledged, "at least three to five" years remained of his
then-present term (R. 44:17). Therefore, contrary to defendant's claims, the court could
not reasonably have interpreted defendant's representations that he could pay the $10,000
"in the very near future . . . within six months" to mean that defendant would be unable to
pay for more than three-and-a-half years. The obvious meaning of defense counsel's
words was that defendant could pay the $10,000 within six months of sentencing.3
Second, defendant claims that the trial court found that "'the defendant does not
have the current ability to pay [restitution], at least, not while he's in custody.'"
Appellant's Brief at 6-7). In reality, the trial court made no such finding. The trial court
found that defendant could not pay the full amount owed—$20,658.17—while
incarcerated (R. 44: 15). The court accordingly gave defendant the option of paying the
amount defendant said he could pay, within the time he said he could pay it.

3

Moreover, when the trial court pronounced sentence reflecting defendant's
representation that he could pay the $10,000 within six months, defense counsel made no
effort to correct the court's alleged misunderstanding.

10

Finally, defendant claims that the trial court failed to take into account defendant's
statement that he could not pay restitution until released from custody (R. 43: 13-14).
Appellant's Brief at 6. However, that statement was made at the change of plea hearing
more than a month before sentencing. Thus, even assuming the trial court remembered
the statement, the court properly did not rely on it. In imposing restitution, the trial court
was entitled to rely on defendant's most recent representations made at the time of
sentencing that defendant could pay $10,000 within six months.
Although the presentence investigation report was not included in the record on
appeal, it is reasonable to assume that the $20,658.17 in restitution requested by the
prosecutor and contingently ordered by the court comprised the amount actually
expended to treat the victim's injuries.4 Defendant has not challenged the accuracy of
that amount. By granting defendant the opportunity to pay less than half the full amount
of damages if he paid the reduced sum within six months, the trial court gave defendant
an undeserved bonus. Defendant led the court to believe that he had already raised
$10,000 from his relatives and that he could pay it within six months of the date of

4

A victim is "any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendants criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(l)(e) (1999). In this case, defendant's victims may have included the correctional
facility which provided medical care to the incarcerated assault victim.
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sentencing. The fact that he did not pay as he represented he could does not negate the
trial court's largesse.5
In sum, the restitution order was reasonable. At minimum, it cannot be said that
"no reasonable person" would have structured the restitution order as the trial court did.
Therefore, the restitution order did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion.6
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY IMPOSED A
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by "imposing a
consecutive sentence after overtly disregarding . . . 'legally relevant factors.'" Appellant's
Brief at 10. He claims that the court failed to consider either his assertion that he
committed the offense in self defense, or his rehabilitative needs as evidenced by his
desire to reduce his restitution obligation so that he could pursue his educational goals
unencumbered. Id.
Since the court stated it followed the recommendation of the presentence
investigation report in imposing the consecutive sentence and defendant has failed to
5

Moreover, defendant does not explain how the court's restitution order prejudiced
him. Defendant was not penalized for failing to pay $10,000 within six months of
sentencing. He was simply left with having to pay the full amount of the victim's
damages.
defendant argues that the trial court displayed "enmity," "ill will," and
"animosity"'in addressing him at sentencing. Appellant's Brief at 7. The record does not
support that claim (R. 44: 13-15). On the face of the transcript, the trial court's remarks
could as easily be interpreted as evidencing concern, empathy, and compassion (idL).
12

include the presentence investigation report in the record on appeal, this Court lacks an
adequate record to review defendant's claim. On the merits, however, the trial court
cannot have abused its discretion when the applicable statute presumed that a consecutive
sentence is appropriate and the record contains nothing to indicate that a consecutive term
was not appropriate.
A.

Because Defendant has Failed to Include the Presentence Investigation
Report in the Record on Appeal, This Court Should Decline to
Consider His Claim.
"An appellate court's 'review is . . . limited to the evidence contained in the record

on appeal.' . . . Therefore, we will not consider evidence which is not part of the record."
State v. Pliego. 974 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1999)(citations omitted)). "When crucial
matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the
action of the trial court." State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); see also State
v. Mitchell 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983). The appellant is responsible to ensure that
the record is adequate to allow analysis of the issues.
In imposing a consecutive sentence, the trial court stated that it followed the
recommendation in the presentence investigation report (R. 44: 15). On appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider all legally relevant factors in
sentencing. In order to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court
must be able to review the factors on which the trial court based its sentencing decision.
The Court cannot conduct the necessary review without the presentence investigation
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report. Because defendant has not included the presentence investigation report in the
record on appeal, the Court cannot decide defendant's claim.
"[T]he presentence investigation report does not become part of the record on
appeal unless a 'party or a party's counsel notifies the court clerk, in writing, that the
presentence investigation report is the subject of an appeal.'" State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d
454, 459 n.12 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-203(2) (1993).
In State v. Eloge. 762 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988), the issue on appeal was whether the
trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation. Eloge failed to include the presentence report in the record on
appeal. Id. at 2. The supreme court concluded that since Eloge had failed to provide
the court with a copy of the presentence investigation report, the court was unable to
"determine whether the trial court's use of that report amounted to an abuse of
discretion." IdL (citing State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)).
As in Eloge, without the presentence investigation report, this Court lacks
sufficient information to review the propriety of the sentence. On that basis, the Court
should refuse to address defendant's challenge to his sentence.
B.

On the Merits. The Trial Court Correctly Sentenced Defendant to a
Consecutive Term of Incarceration.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999) ordinarily requires the trial court to

"consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and

14

rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences." Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider the circumstances of
the offense because the court imposed a consecutive sentence in spite of defendant's
claims that he acted in self defense. Appellant's Brief at 10. Further, he claims that the
court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs; specifically, "the need for a release in the
near future to begin restitution payments and the need to resume his education" Id
When an imprisoned defendant commits a crime, a consecutive sentence is
presumed to be appropriate. Utah Code Ann. § § 76-3-401(2) (1999) provides that "the
court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds and states
on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate [emphasis added]."
Although qualified, the statutory language is mandatory. By its terms, the statute
contains a presumption that consecutive sentences are appropriate where an inmate
commits an offense while incarcerated, unless there is evidence, and the trial court finds,
that consecutive sentences are inappropriate.
In arguing that the trial court failed to consider the circumstances of the offense or
his rehabilitative needs, defendant ignores the principle that the trial court, in exercising
its discretion, was not required to accept his representations or to give them determinative
weight. See State v. Russell 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in mitigation or
aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale."); State v.
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Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("Although generally a sentencing judge will give
considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other
factors."); State v. NuttalL 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than
rehabilitating him"). Here, defendant waited until sentencing to assert that he assaulted
Dow in self defense, and the trial court was properly unswayed. Furthermore, although
defendant argued for reduced restitution on the ground that he "would like to enroll in
college and pursue a degree (R. 44: 10)," that goal is shared by many inmates, and
opportunities to attain it are available to defendant in prison.7 The trial court had
discretion to conclude that defendant's desire to attend college as a free man did not
overcome the legislative determination that inmates who commit additional crimes in jail
should serve consecutive sentences.
Defendant cites State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), and State v. Strunk 846
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), to support his argument that his consecutive sentence was
improper. Those cases are inapplicable because they did not involve defendants who
committed offenses while incarcerated. Therefore, the presumption of section 76-3401(2) that consecutive sentencing is appropriate did not apply in those cases. In any
event, the rationale for reversing the sentences imposed in Smith and Strunk does not

7

Although the trial court sentenced defendant to a jail term (R. 31), defendant
elected to serve his sentence in prison (R. 35).
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support reversal here. 'The only situations in the past where [an abuse of discretion has
been found] were instances in which the consecutive sentences were grossly
disproportional." State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 941 (Utah 1998) (Zimmerman, J.,
dissenting). Defendant's one-year jail sentence was not "grossly disproportional" (R. 32;
44:15). Therefore, the rulings in Smith and Strunk are limited to the facts of those cases
and are irrelevant here. See State v. Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1996).
Despite defendant's assertions that a consecutive sentence was improper because
he acted in self defense and because his rehabilitation would be hampered by consecutive
sentences, the court correctly did not accord those considerations sufficient weight to
overcome the statutory presumption that consecutive sentencing was appropriate. Thus,
this Court should affirm defendant's sentence.

17

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's sentence.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no important, novel, or complex issues of law, the State
does not request oral argument or a published opinion.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

PUNISHMENTS

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities'9 means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages1* means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facta or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means ftill, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any cms of the foUowing sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fins;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or caned a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impoee any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.

(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (lXe).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4X0 and (4Xd).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department electa to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to reeohre pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4X0.
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the reetitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subeection (8).

(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court orderfromone county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 far 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (SXcXi) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying drcumitancee in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in

the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity; includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or lost if the offense resulted in damage
to or loes or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognised by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result ofthe offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary ftineral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability ofthe defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.

PART 4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently.
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as
provided under Subsection (8Kb).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6Xa) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are
imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6Xa) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6Xa) applies, determining the effect
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and

(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of
where the person is located.
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January 19, 2 000.

Beaver, Utah.

PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Bobby Hodges.
Mr. Hodges is present.

Matter's on for sentencing.

Mr. Hodges, have you read the presentence report in
your case?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, I have.

THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to go
ahead with sentencing?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, I am.

THE COURT: Mr. Christiansen.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Before we speak briefly
about restitution, Mr. Hodges did have some matters
regarding not presentence investigation prepared by
Officer Lowry, but the presentence investigation that
was attached as an exhibit to the report that
Officer Lowry entered, the presentence investigation
prepared by Davis County,
THE COURT: All right.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The corrections he would
like to make and bring to the attention of the court
are, first of all, it indicates that he was on
probation in the state of Florida.

Mr. Hodges informs

me that that's not correct, that he was not on
probation.
3

THE DEFENDANT:

1
2

They just started that back in
THE COURT:

3
4

I have never been on parole.

98.

There is a difference between

parole and probation.
THE DEFENDANT: I know,

5

When I got out of

6

prison, they don't have -- they didn't start -- they

7

didn't have probation -- parole when I got out of

8

prison
THE COURT:

9

Okay.

THE DEFENDANT: In the thing he wrote that I

10
11

was on parole and violated it.

12

didn't start that back until '98 of January.
THE COURT:

13

That's not true.

They

Can you refer me to the page

14

where that notation occurs so I can see where it fits

15

into the scheme of things?

16

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

17

number off hand.

18

for me

I ' munaware of the page

I need to have Mr. Hodges find that

THE COURT:

19

Are you able to find it?

Okay.

I am wondering, are you

20

referring to page six under "e"?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

23

Yeah,

Yeah.

Is that what you are talking

about?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yeah.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

It says, "The defendant denied

ever having been supervised under formal probation or
parole in the State of Utah; however, he has been on
probation and parole in the state of Florida.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

Parole part is not

true.
THE COURT: But you have been on probation in
Floridal
THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

But not parole?

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

No, sir.

Okay.

AD?. CHRISTIANSEN:
couple of more.

Any other corrections?
Yes, there are just a

In addition, and if you'll turn the

page back over to the criminal history contained in
the second presentence investigation, the page number
on that is page five.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Also page four.

The

defendant simply wanted me to indicate that where it
indicates charges were dismissed, or on the second
page, page five that there is no information
available, that there were no convictions in those
cases, specifically the no information available
cases.

And he indicates that in those cases another

5

person used his name to try -THE DEFENDANT:

Several times.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

--to try and get a

conviction against him in those cases.
THE DEFENDANT: And I would have to come in
and I.D. the person. And they got convicted for it.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

And the final matter we

would like to correct from this second PSI, is that it
mentions that the defendant has a drug problem.

He

tells me that that's simply not true, that he has no
drug problem.

And he has, for the court's examination

today, a number of certificates that show his
successful completion of some drug treatment programs,
most of which, I believe, were sponsored by the
prison.
THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay.

Thank you.

Anything else,

Mr. Christiansen?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We would like to speak
briefly now about the issue of restitution.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And this won't take any
longer than just a couple of minutes.

The defendant

entered his plea of guilty in this case because he's
6

willing to accept responsibility for his actions in
the altercation.

Nevertheless, in entering its order

of restitution, there are some facts about the
altercation that the court ought to be aware of in
making its sentencing.

Now, our intention here is not

to reopen the trial or to retry the facts.

That's not

what we want to do. We simply want to make the court
informed of the different versions of the altercation
so that it can make an informed decision.

So I would

refer the court, first of all, to the version of the
offense given by the victim himself found on page two
of the presentence investigation.
It reads as follows:

"Inmate Dow stated he

had changed the TV channel and defendant, Bobby
Hodges, struck him in the face."
That's it.

If your reaction was anything

similar to mine after reading this, I was completely
unsatisfied with this explanation and, in my mind, it
just didn't make sense.

I think a better analysis of

the altercation, perhaps a more objective one, was the
account given by Mr. 0'Granado.

And this is

contained -THE DEFENDANT: Granado.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Granado.

Thank you.

This

is contained on page five of the presentence
7

investigation.

And, also, there is a handwritten

account submitted by Mr. O'Granado about four, five
pages from the back.

I'll read from his handwritten

account.
"I, Mark O'Granado, witnessed the fight over
the TV.

Mr. Brian Dow" -- and that's the victim, "had

a destructive attitude the day after his board
hearing.

Mr. Dow was miserable, to say the least.

The fact of the matter is, that Mr. Dow started the
fight.

He asked Bobby Hodges to take it into

Mr. Dow's room to take care of matters.

He asked two

times.

Mr. Hodges declined, stating he didn't want to

fight.

Plus he would be out of bounds.

then pushed Mr. Hodges.

Brian Dow

Then Mr. Hodges backed up.

Mr. Dow then lunged at Mr. Hodges.

Mr. Hodges then

struck Brian in the cheek in self-defense.

And that

was the end of the fight."
This second version of the altercation is
more consistent with the observations of the
defendant's character made by at least one of the
officers who was a guard there in the prison,
Officer Jeremy Haywood.

And his comments are found on

page three under the law enforcement statement.

His

observations of the defendant are that, "He has been
an ideal inmate and that he has stayed out of the
8

trouble except for this single incident."
Now, if the court would like even a second
version of the offense --of the events and of the
altercation that took place that day, he tells me
there is presently an inmate by the name of Mark
Montez who can collaborate the version given by
Mr. O'Granado.

I don't think that's necessary.

think Mr. O'Granado's version was adequate.

I

But if

the court wants a corroboration of that, then
Mr. Montez is available to testify today.
So what does this tell the court?

Well, it

tells the court, yes, Mr. Hodges did commit a wrong
that day, in striking Mr. Dow.

But, on the other

hand, Mr. Hodges did not act alone that day, that the
victim also played a part in the altercation.

And for

that reason we would request that Mr. Hodges not be
held responsible for payment of the full amount of
restitution, that the court recognize that the victim
did have a role in what took place.
Now, whatever amount the court determines
will be fine. We simply ask that it be a fair share
of the restitution.

Our suggestion, however, is this:

Mr. Hodges informs me that by collecting funds from
family members and from friends he's been able to come
up with $10,000 which he would be able to have paid as
9

restitution m

the very near future.

And so his

suggestion would simply be that the court order
restitution in the amount of $10,000 to cover
Mr. Hodges participation in the altercation and to
cover his responsibility for what happened that day.
THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Maybe one final matter.

The defendant indicated in the presentence
investigation that as soon as he's out of jail he
would like to enroll in college and pursue a degree in
business administration.

I think that's a good idea

for him to be able to get on with his life and make
some positive changes and contribute to society.

And

a heavy order of restitution is going to encumber him
from being able to do that.
Mr. Hodges has also demonstrated some serious
changes in behavior.

You may have noticed the

statement presented by Mr. Bill Wagner who is a
Methodist minister in Milford who has been meeting
with the defendant and who has observed that
Mr. Hodges1 has gained new meaning in his life because
of religion and has demonstrated a desire to sincerely
change and to make some improvements in his life.
THE COURT: All right.

Anything else,

Mr. Christiansen?
10

1

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

2

THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, the state's position?

3

MR. KANELL:

No.

Your Honor, we are going to

4

submit the issue of restitution to the court.

5

state is the victim in this.

6

extensive medical problems to the other inmate.

7

than that, we recommend the - - w e agree with the

8

recommendations in the report.

9

thorough and accurate.

10

The

The damages were
Other

We think the report is

I think I do have a duty to respond to the

11

suggestions that have been made on behalf of the

12

victim, Your Honor.

13

this is one of those extremely typical cases that we

14

investigate in the back.

15

serious physical injuries, and he's telling what

16

happened.

17

himself, just the discussion about changing the

18

television channel and him being hit in the face.

19

I would like to point out that all of these other

20

witnesses had the opportunity to testify or to give a

21

statement at the time.

22

about as being typical in the facility; no one, at

And just to let you know that

And we have a victim who has

His version did not include any pushing by

And

And this is what Ifm talking

23

I that time when the officer investigated it, could

24

| really remember what had happened or had seen

25

| anything.

No one knew anything about it.

And the

injured inmate was transferred to another place. And
Mr. Hodges has stayed here. And, as time goes on,
then people now are suddenly willing to give a version
of the offense.

And so we don't feel that there can

be given much credibility to those statements.

You

know, if they would have been willing to say what they
saw right at the time that the events occurred, it
could have been helpful testimony to us. But
statements that are offered later on don't offer much
credibility for us.
THE COURT: All right.

Do you have any

response at all to the suggestion that the court
should fix the restitution at a figure lower than is
recommended in the presentence report?
MR. KANELL: Well, I think the statute allows
the court to consider not only the amount of
restitution that should be set, but also the ability
of the person to pay restitution.

And I think we all

understand that Mr. Hodges doesn't have a very big
ability to pay restitution while he's incarcerated.
So it will be something that is attached to his parole
when he gets out on parole.

Ifm not sure whether he

has other restitution amounts based upon his other
crimes or not.

But, I feel like the court would have

a better ability to determine what should be due the
12

state.
And I assume that if family or friends have
raised $10,000 that would be available in the near
future, that that's more than anyone would probably
expect.

And I assume if he were to be placed on

parole, he would, I hope, would feel an obligation to
pay that amount back to whoever offered it for him.
So I'm not adverse to some kind of structure, whereas,
if that money were to go to the state right away, that
the court would consider a reduction in the amount of
the restitution.
THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Christiansen,
on that subject?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

We are pleased, if the

state's willing, to make that recommendation.

And we

agree that a lesser amount than the full amount of
restitution (inaudible).
THE COURT: What is the structure you are
proposing?

When would the $10,000 be paid?

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Mr. Hodges informs me that

the full 10,000 could be paid within six months.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Mr. Hodges,

anything you would like to say?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor.

Urn, I

just, totally unexpected for me, you know.

But I

13

1

turned the cheek three times, not only twice, but

2

three times, you know.

3

again, I had to defend myself.

4

guys not coming forward, see a lot of people don't

5

understand, prison people don't just come forward and

6

tell on no -- on the inmate because you be labeled a

7

snitch and you have major problems.

8

came forward, because not everyone was interviewed.

9

You know what I mean?

10

And when he lunged at me
And the matter of the

That's why no one

It's like over 20 some people

in the cell block.

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry what happened.

Um-hmm.

13

mean, I didn't want this to happen.

14

responsibility for it because I'm a man.

15

have to say.

16
17
18
19
20

But I take my
That's all I

THE COURT: Do you have any idea of why these
same inmates now have chosen to come forward?
THE DEFENDANT: Basically, because they know
I wasn't wrong.
THE COURT:

Sure would have been a lot more

21

simple if they would have said that in the first

22

place, hu?

23

I

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know.

But still,

24

like I said before, not everyone was interviewed, you

25

know what I mean, when they had the investigation, you
14

know.

It's kind of hard for a person just to come up

and tell on the person when you are doing time.
THE COURT: Well, if you'll pardon a little
digression, Mr. Hodges, that's one of the problems
with those that you are doing time with, is that they
don't understand the rules that makes society operate.
If they had come forward in the first place, you might
not even be standing there convicted.

But because

they honored this code of silence, you are now
suffering the consequences.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT: Okay.
the sentence of the court:

I know all of that.
I hope they do.

This is

I sentence you to serve a

year in the county jail, consecutive to the term that
you are currently serving, which is recommended by the
presentence report.
On the subject of restitution, I'm going to
fix the amount of restitution at $20,658.17. But I'm
also going to find that the defendant does not have
the current ability to pay that, at least, not while
he's in custody.

So I'm going to order that if he

pays $10,000 restitution within the next six months,
that he will not need to pay the remainder of the
restitution.

If he's not -- if he does not pay the

$10,000 within six months, then the order of the court
15

will be that he's to pay the entire amount of
restitution upon his release. Any questions?

Okay.

Then, that will be the sentence.
You have the right to appeal any action of
the court.
today.

Mr. Hodges, right to appeal begins to run

If it is your intent to appeal, you have to

file written notice with the clerk within 3 0 days or
else you lose the right to appeal even if you have
good grounds.

Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

I just got one

question.
THE COURT: Go right ahead.
THE DEFENDANT:

I don't understand how come I

was charged and he wasn't, and there's been over a
hundred fights here, and I am the only one being
charged.

I don't understand that.
THE COURT: You are not the only one being

charged.

Believe me.

You are not the first person

that I've sentenced on fights back in the jail. As
far as the charging decision, that was not my
decision, so I'm not the one to ask.
THE DEFENDANT:

I just think it should go

both ways.
THE COURT:

I agree.

THE DEFENDANT:

Not just one person get stuck
16

1

with a year county time.

2

three to five before I even do that year.

3

know that.

You know?

I'm going to do at least

It just ain't right.

THE COURT: All right.

4

I already

Well, I will simply

5

say this, that based on the evidence that the officers

6

were able to collect at the time this thing originally

7

occurred, and mainly because, as I said, nobody was

8

willing to talk about it, that's why you were the only

9

one charged.

The only statement they had to go on was

10

the statement of the defendant and, in fact,

11

Mr. Hodges, you did plead guilty and, therefore, the

12

court is required to impose sentence.

13

you, sir.

14
15
16
17
18
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20
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Good luck to

CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING
PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BEFORE ME, RUSSEL D. MORGAN, A
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF
UTAH, RESIDING AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH;
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BY ME
IN STENOTYPE FROM AN ELECTRONIC RECORDING, AND
THEREAFTER CAUSED BY ME TO BE TRANSCRIBED INTO
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION
OF SAID TESTIMONY SO TAKEN AND TRANSCRIBED TO THE BEST
OF MY ABILITY IS SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING PAGES
NUMBERED FROM 3 TO 17 INCLUSIVE.

"RUSSEL D. MORGAN, 6CSR
LICENSE #87-108442-7801

18

